Several empirical studies have found that extended household units do not appear to be highly altruistically linked, thereby violating the very premise of the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH). This finding has a very strong implication for the effectiveness of fiscal policies that change the allocation of resources between generations. We build a two-sided altruistic-linkage model in which private transfers are made in the presence of two types of shocks: an "observable" shock that is public information (for example, a public redistribution like debt or pay-as-you-go social security) and an "unobservable" shock that is private information (for example, individual wage innovations). Parents and children observe each other's total income but not each other's effort level. In the second-best solution, unobservable shocks are only partially shared, whereas, for any utility function satisfying a condition derived herein, observable shocks are fully shared. The model, therefore, can generate the low degree of risk sharing found in previous empirical studies, but REH still holds. Several empirical studies have found that extended household units do not appear to be highly altruistically linked, thereby violating the very premise of the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH). This finding has a very strong implication for the effectiveness of fiscal policies that change the allocation of resources between generations. We build a two-sided altruistic-linkage model in which private transfers are made in the presence of two types of shocks: an "observable" shock that is public information (for example, a public redistribution like debt or pay-as-you-go social security) and an "unobservable" shock that is private information (for example, individual wage innovations). Parents and children observe each other's total income but not each other's effort level. In the second-best solution, unobservable shocks are only partially shared, whereas, for any utility function satisfying a condition derived herein, observable shocks are fully shared. The model, therefore, can generate the low degree of risk sharing found in previous empirical studies, but REH still holds.
Introduction
According the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis (REH), altruistically-linked households alter their private intergenerational transfers to offset changes in the timing of public taxes and transfers, thereby neutralitizing the public program's effectiveness (Ricardo, 1820, reprinted in 1951; Barro, 1974) . Tax timing changes include a government budget deficit or an increase in pay-as-you-go social security spending, which shift resources from the younger to older cohorts. Under REH, these tax transfers are offset by larger bequests from parents to their children, undoing their effectiveness. Budget deficits and reforms like a move toward a funded Social Security system effectively become irrelevant. It is not surprising, therefore, that REH has generated a very lively debate during the past three decades. See, for example, the literature reviews in Bernheim (1987) , Weil (1989) , Seater (1993) , Barro (1998) , Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) , and Smetters (1999) .
While many economists do not believe that Ricardian equivalence is a close description of reality, 1 the actual empirical evidence is mixed, especially when analyzing aggregate data (see reviews by Seater 1993; Congressional Budget Office 1998). Household-level data sets, however, have become more widely available in the past two decades, thereby allowing for a more direct test of the altruism tenet underlying Ricardian equivalence. The earliest work by Tomes (1981) and Bernheim (1991) find some limited evidence in favor of the altruism model. Page (2003) shows that intergenerational transfers made by many households are sensitive to differences in tax rates across U.S. states, consistent with altruism. But, in an important series of papers, Kotlikoff (1992, 1997) and Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff (1996) demonstrate that the evidence for altruism is likely well below that needed to support REH. For example, AHK (1997) estimate that a $1 decrease in permanent income of a child combined with a $1 increase in permanent income of his/her parents produces less than a $0.13 increase in private transfer from parent to child -much less than the $1 transfer required by REH. 2 Consistently, Wilhelm (1996) finds little evidence 1 For example, in Slemrod's (1995) survey of the National Tax Association (including 521 academics, 406 government employees, and 381 private-sector employees), 89 percent of those responding replied in the affirmative to the question, "Does a large federal budget deficit have an adverse effect on the economy?" 2 Other authors have regressed consumption growth on income growth in order to test for the presence of risk sharing outside of the family. See Cochrane (1991) , Mace (1991) , and Townsend (1994) . Altug and Labadie 1 that bequests compensate for earnings differences between parents and children. While Cox, Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) find evidence of risk sharing in a developing economy, it is at a level well short of the full offset predicted by the altruistic-linkage model.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the conventionally estimated low level of risk sharing between parent households and child households is not necessarily inconsistent with the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis. We build a two-sided altruistic-linkage model in which private transfers are made in the presence of two types of shocks: an "observable" shock that is public information among households (for example, public redistribution) and an "unobservable" shock that is private information (for example, idiosyncratic wages). Parents and children observe each other's total income but not each other's endogenous level of labor market effort. A risk-sharing arrangement contingent on effort level (the first-best solution), therefore, is not possible. In the second-best solution, unobservable shocks are only partially shared in the presence of moral hazard (slack). But, observable shocks (for example, tax timing changes) will be fully shared provided that the utility function satisfies a condition derived herein. As a result, our model can reproduce the low degree of risk sharing found in recent empirical studies, but REH (the private offset of public transfers) still holds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic principal-agent model between parents and their children. Section 3 demonstrates how familial risk-sharing arrangements distort work incentives (that is, create moral hazard) when first-best arrangements are not possible. Section 4 formally derives the first-best and second-best optimal risk-sharing arrangements. Section 5 presents some examples of utility functions in which Ricardian equivalence holds in the presence of a potentially low level of observed risk sharing. Section 6 discusses the interdependence of the risk-sharing arrangements for observable and unobservable shocks in the second-best equilibrium. Section 7 concludes the paper.
The Model

Income Shocks and Risk-Sharing Arrangements
Consider two altruistic households, i ∈ {1, 2}, specifically, parents and children. Each household receives two types of income shocks, s i and t i . The shock s i is an idiosyncratic (1994) discuss the empirical methodology in detail. 2 income shock to household i that is unobservable to the other household, −i. The shock t i is a government tax transfer to household i that is observable to both households. The cumulative probability distributions for s i and t i , F (s i ) and G (t i ), are independent, and the corresponding density functions are symmetric around zero. 3 So, E (s i ) = E (t i ) = 0.
The pre-transfer labor income y i of household i (that is, before observable shocks) is defined as the sum of its unobservable effort level ("hours worked"), h i , and unobservable shock s i , that is,
The sum y i is observable, but its components are not independently observable, prohibiting first-best risk sharing. 4 Both types of shocks can be shared among households. Let σ ∈ [0, 0.5] be the risksharing plan for unobservable shocks s i . In particular, σ is equal to the proportion of the 
The Timing of the Model
The timing of the households' actions is as follows:
1. Two households determine the risk-sharing plan (σ, τ ) based on the distributions of the shocks, F (s i ) and G (t i ), and the degree of altruism φ that is part of their utility 
Cumulative probability distribution for the unobserved shock
Cumulative probability distribution for the observed shock t i function (shown below);
2. Each household decides its working hours (effort level), h i and h −i ;
3. Two types of shocks, (s i , s −i ) and (t i , t −i ), are realized;
4. Income is redistributed between households on the basis of the risk-sharing arrangement, (σ, τ ).
The Household Problem and Optimal Effort, h
Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992) (herein AHK) present a one-sided altruism model with inelastic effort in which parents and children overlap for two periods. Parents and children face earnings uncertainty only over the second overlapping period. AHK demonstrate that all inter-generational transfers will occur only in the second period unless a child is liquidity constrained in the first period. 5 We extend the AHK model to allow for two-sided altruism as well as an endogenous level of effort. The focus on two-sided altruism not only allows for cleaner analytical derivations, it also gives the REH the best chance of holding in the presence of imperfect risk sharing. Showing that REH is compatible in the presence of the evidence of imperfect risk sharing is the core motivation of this paper. Since our focus is on the role of moral hazard and not liquidity constraints, we also focus on the second overlapping period. 6 The two households place an equal weight, φ, on each other's utility, where φ = 1
indicates full altruism and φ = 0 indicates no altruism. Household i's problem, therefore, is
subject to
Notice that household i's consumption is dependent on its own income, y i , as well as the income of household −i, y −i . Household i keeps (1 − σ) of its own income, y i , and shares the remaining fraction, σ, with household −i. Conversely, it receives σ fraction of the income from household −i. The observable tax transfers, t i and t −i , are similarly shared.
Substituting c i , c −i , l i , and l −i into the utility function with
The first-order condition with respect to h i is
The Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis considers how parents and children respond to shocks that are symmetric ex post: s −i = −s i and t −i = −t i . Specifically, REH focuses on shocks that are realized to be symmetric; the shocks are not anticipated to be symmetric ex ante. Ex post symmetric shocks are always insurable within two households; REH posits that they will, in fact, be fully insured. The above first-order condition, however, is an ex ante condition: neither parent or child knows how the shock of the other household is correlated with its own shock when decided its own policy (optimal response) function. Consistent with REH, we also only analyze realized shocks that are symmetric; considering realized non-symmetric shocks would add cubersome notation without providing any greater insights into the test of REH itself.
The income of household i after risk sharing, therefore, is defined as
where we used the fact that s −i = −s i . The amount of the observable shock borne by household i after risk sharing, therefore, is
where we used the fact that
By the symmetric assumption, the expected utilities of the two households are then the same, that is,
Substituting this equation into our first-order condition produces: 7
Moreover, the optimal working hours of the two households are the same, that is,
and the optimal working hours, h (σ, τ ; φ, F (s i ), G(t i )), solve
The Impact of Risk Sharing on Effort
Although it is difficult to solve for h analytically since we have not yet specified a utility function, this section characterizes how the optimal working hours vary with the risk-sharing plan, (σ, τ ). Toward this end, we make some standard assumptions about the utility function. Utility is increasing in the level of the consumption of goods and leisure but at a decreasing
; the marginal utility of consumption and leisure might be separable or nonseparable provided that it is nondecreasing in the level of the other
agents do not exhibit imprudence (u ccc ≥ 0). 8 
Lemma 1 (Impact of σ on effort, h) (1) When two households are not fully altruistic to each other (0 ≤ φ < 1), the optimal level of effort, h, is strictly decreasing in the amount of the unobservable shock that is shared by the other household, σ, for all
Proof. Totally differentiating the first-order condition (6) with respect to h and σ, we have
This equation implies
Since u cc < 0, u ll < 0, and u cl = u lc ≥ 0, the denominator on the right-hand side becomes strictly negative. We now want to prove that the numerator is positive. Since the two types of shocks are normalized to be independent, then
. (6)) and u ccc ≥ 0,
holding with equality if and only if σ = 0.5 or u ccc = 0. So, R u cc dG(t i ) is strictly negative and nondecreasing in s i . Since u lcc ≤ 0, we have
holding with equality if and only if σ = 0.5 or u lcc = 0. So, R u lc dG(t i ) is non-negative and nonincreasing in s i . When F (s i ) is symmetric with mean 0, we, therefore, have Discussion. Let's first discuss the case in which altruism is not full, followed by the case in which altruism is full.
(1) In words, d dσ h (σ, τ ) < 0 implies that households exhibit less effort as the level of risk sharing between households increases. When altruism is not full, (φ < 1), households attempt to take advantage of a greater amount of risk sharing by working less. Each household values an increase in its own leisure but bears only a fraction of the concomitant decrease 8 in its own wage income under positive levels of risk sharing. As a result, moral hazard is a problem whether households exhibit prudence (u ccc > 0) or not (u ccc = 0). But when agents are also prudent, the increase in risk sharing, σ, also reduces their prudence-driven supply of effort, h. The reason is that effort level decisions are made before the shocks are realized. Hence, a prudent household will supply less effort in lower risk situations (those associated with more risk sharing). So the effects of moral hazard and prudence work in the same direction to generate less effort as risk sharing increases, thereby allowing us to sign the derivative Proof. Totally differentiating (6) with respect to τ and h, we have
Since u cc < 0, u ll < 0, and u cl = u lc ≥ 0, the denominator of the right-hand side is strictly negative. Similarly to the previous proof, we can show that Discussion. Comparing the last two lemmas, notice that the relationship between the level of effort, h, and the amount of observable risk that is shared, τ , is similar to the response of effort to the amount of nonobservable shock that is shared, σ, under full altruism (φ = 1). Intuitively, there is no private information contained in observable shocks; and when shocks are unobservable, there is no desire to take advantage of the private information when altruism is full. Hence, in both cases, the direct role of moral hazard is not present. However, notice from equation (8) that dh/dτ is not independent of σ unless u ccc = u lcc = 0 (that is, unless agents are not prudent). In other words, the change in the effort level in response to a change in τ cannot be determined independently from σ since σ also affects the optimal choice for h. The interdependence of σ and τ is discussed in Section 6.
The Optimal Risk-Sharing Arrangement (σ, τ )
This section derives the first-best and second-best optimal risk-sharing arrangements (σ, τ ).
As proven below, if first-best risk-sharing arrangements were available (that is, all shocks were observable), then shocks would be fully insurable. Similarly, full insurance is optimal in the second-best equilibrium provided that agents are fully altruistic (φ = 1). In both of those cases, moral hazard does not exist because either agents have no private information (as in the first-best equilibrium) or agents have no incentive to take advantage of their private information (as with full altruism).
In the more general case, when private information exists and altruism is not full, (φ < 1), moral hazard becomes relevant. The optimal risk-sharing arrangement, therefore, must balance the benefits of risk sharing against the costs of moral hazard. Moral hazard prevents full risk sharing. Still, we demonstrate that observable shocks will be fully shared provided that preferences satisfy a condition that we derive. In other words, Ricardian equivalence can hold in the presence of incomplete risk sharing.
Lemma 3
The optimal risk-sharing arrangement (σ, τ ) solves the following set of equations:
and
Proof. By the symmetric shock assumption,
The optimal insurance combination (σ, τ ) is obtained by solving
The first-order conditions are
Use of the first-order condition for h, or equation (5), to eliminate E u l from the above equations produces equations (9) and (10).
First-Best Risk Sharing
The previous lemma nests the solutions to the first-best and second-best equilibrium. To get the first-best equilibrium, we can simply normalize s i = 0 to remove the unobservable shock, leaving only the observable shock. 10
Proposition 4
With only observable shocks (s i = 0), risk is fully shared (that is, τ = 0.5).
Proof. If there are no unobservable shocks, (s i = 0), no risk sharing based on the labor income y i and y −i is needed, that is, σ = 0. Hence, equation (10) 
Since u cc < 0, we have Discussion. In the first-best economy, there is no moral hazard. Full risk sharing, therefore, is always desirable in the presence of concave preferences. Risk sharing reduces (or eliminates in the case of symmetric shocks) the variability in income of each agent without reducing the expected income. This result is analogous to the standard result in insurance economics that full insurance is optimal if there are no premium loads.
Second-Best Risk Sharing
We now derive the second-best risk-sharing arrangements in the presence of unobservable shocks, that is, when F (s i ) is not degenerate. We first consider the case of full altruism, (φ = 1), followed by the more general case of nonfull altruism, (φ < 1).
Full Altruism (φ = 1)
Proposition 5 When two households are fully altruistic to each other, perfect insurance is optimal for both unobservable and observable shocks, that is, φ = 1 =⇒ (σ * , τ * ) = (0.5, 0.5).
Proof. When φ = 1, the first-order conditions, (9) and (10), imply
Since u cc < 0, we have (9) becomes
Altruism Less Than Full (φ < 1)
Proposition 6 When two households are not fully altruistic to each other, the second-best level of risk sharing for the unobservable shock is less than full, that is
When σ = 0.5,
Since the left-hand side of equation (9) is continuous for all σ ∈ [0, 0.5], the optimal σ that satisfies equation (9) exists and σ * ∈ (0, 0.5). Moreover, since the left-hand side of equation (9) is positive at σ = 0 and it is negative at σ = 0.5, then the second-order requirement for a maximum is also satisfied. 11 for observable shocks to be fully shared (τ * = 0.5)-that is, for Ricardian equivalence to hold-is
Proposition 7 A sufficient condition
where
Proof. Similar to the proof for Lemma 1, it can be shown that τ = 0.
Thus the first-order condition (10) holds for all σ ∈ [0, 0.5]. The first-order conditions, (9) and (10), along with equations (7) and (8), imply
where Φ = 1 − σ + φ σ. Since E u c > 0, a necessary condition for τ * to be less than 0.5 is
at τ * . In other words, a sufficient condition for τ * = 0.5 is (11), therefore, is a sufficient condition for τ * = 0.5.
Proposition 8
In the special case in which utility is separable (u cl = u lc = 0), a sufficient condition for observable shocks to be fully shared (τ * = 0.5)-that is, for Ricardian equivalence to hold-is
Proof. By assumption, E [u lc s i ] = E [u lc t i ] = 0. From Proposition 7, the inequality (12) is a sufficient condition for τ * = 0.5.
Corollary 9 (Existence of (σ * , τ * )) If condition (11) or (12) holds, then a second-best risksharing arrangement, (σ * , τ * ), exists in which Ricardian equivalence holds despite the presence of imperfect risk sharing (0 < σ * < 0.5; τ * = 0.5).
Discussion. Two observations are in order. First, notice that degree of altruism does not play an important role in the first-best equilibrium, but it does play an important role in the second-best equilibrium. As emphasized by Barro (1974 Barro ( , 1996 , the degree of altruism itself is not critical for Ricardian equivalence to hold in the standard deterministic altruisticlinkage model or, similarly, in the first-best equilibrium in the case of uncertainty. As long as altruism is strong enough for intergenerational transfers (in either direction) to be operative, all shocks will be fully shared between parents and their children in the first-best equilibrium.
In the second-best equilibrium, however, the degree of altruism plays a critical role in limiting the degree to which unobservable shocks are shared. Only if altruism is full, (φ = 1), will all shocks be fully shared in the second-best equilibrium because only then do parents and children not have the incentive to take advantage of their private information. When altruism is less than full, (φ < 1), only observable shocks will be fully shared in equilibrium.
Second, the inequality (11) or (12) is not strong enough to rule out the possibility of multiple second-best equilibria. Stronger conditions on the utility function are required to ensure uniqueness. We do not derive the conditions required for uniqueness in this paper because that issue is both quite complicated and unnecessary for our purposes. (The next section, however, does provide several examples of preferences for which the equilibrium is unique.)
Even if multiple equilibria exist for a particular utility function, the above analysis proves that risk sharing will be incomplete at each equilibrium; however, Ricardian equivalence still holds for any utility function satisfying (11) or (12). Proof. When the utility function is quadratic, u ccc = 0. Then,
Thus, the sufficient condition (12) holds with equality.
Example 11 (Proposition) When the utility function, u(c, l), is separable in consumption and leisure, and its consumption part is one of constant absolute risk aversion, full insurance
for an observable shock is optimal, that is, τ * = 0.5.
Proof.
When the utility function is CARA with the coefficient of absolute risk aversion η, we have u cc = −η u c for all s i and t i . Then,
The sufficient condition (12) Table 2 presents some illustrative numerical results for the CRRA specification:
1−γ , where β is set to unity. Obviously, this example is not intended to be a carefully calibrated numerical experiment. Rather, our intention was to demonstrate the role of the risk aversion parameter, γ, in determining the optimal risk-sharing arrangement, (τ * , σ * ).
Notice that τ * = 0.50 in each case, that is, the observable shock is always fully shared.
Notice also that the σ * is increasing in γ. One reason that σ * increases is that moral hazard becomes less important at higher levels of γ; in particular, agents that are very prudent have less incentive to try to free ride off the risk sharing provided by the other agent. To see why, recall that agent i's pretax income is y i = h i + s i . Less free riding (that is, higher h i ) reduces agent i's probability of suffering from a low value of y i after the unobservable shock s i is realized. As a result, more risk can be optimally shared among more prudent agents, since they are less likely to try to take advantage of it. Another reason that σ * increases in γ is that the utility value of risk sharing increases in γ. As a result, the balance between controlling moral hazard and providing risk sharing shifts toward more risk sharing as the value of γ increases.
6 The Joint Determination of τ * and σ * in the Second-Best Economy Thus far, we have proven that (i) all shocks will be fully shared in the first-best economy, whereas (ii) the nonobservable shock will only be partially shared in the second-best economy. Both of those results were proven to hold provided that the derivatives, cross-derivatives, and higher-order derivatives of the utility function satisfy some fairly general conditions that were stated in the beginning of Section 2. We then showed that (iii) the observable shock may be fully shared in the second-best equilibrium. However, in proving result (iii), we specified an additional sufficient condition, (11) . The presence of that additional condition leads to an interesting question: why wasn't an extra sufficient condition used to demonstrate full risk sharing in the first-best economy, result (i)? In other words, if a shock is fully observable, does it really matter if nonobservable shocks are also present, as in the second-best economy? In still other words, why doesn't result (iii) immediately follow from results (i) and (ii), thereby allowing us to avoid the additional sufficient condition (11) that we used to prove result (iii)? This section answers those questions by demonstrating the interdependence of τ * and σ * in the second-best economy whenever agents are prudent.
As noted in Section 2, equation (8) shows that dh/dτ is not independent of σ unless u ccc = u lcc = 0 (that is, unless agents are not prudent). As a result, we generally cannot set τ * and σ * independently of each other in the second-best economy (unless agents are not prudent). In contrast, all shocks can, of course, be independently shared in the first-best economy where complete contracting is available.
We now illustrate the joint determination of τ * and σ * in the second-best economy using the CRRA example considered in the previous section with γ = 0.5. Table 3 reports the agent's level of effort, h, and utility, u, at the second-best equilibrium tuple (τ * , σ * ) = (0.50, 0.04) as well as at two nonequilibrium values of (τ , σ). Of course, the highest level of utility is at the second-best equilibrium point, which is marked in Table 3 with asterisks (*). But now consider the other two nonequilibrium tuples where the level of risk sharing for the unobservable shock is set above its optimal level (that is, σ > σ * ). Notice that the tuple (τ, σ) = (0.50, 0.50), where both shocks are fully shared, generates less effort and lower utility than the tuple (τ, σ) = (0.00, 0.50), where the observable shock is not shared at all.
In other words, the "third-best" (that is, constrained) outcome does not necessarily fully share the observable shock when the unobservable shock is being shared too much relative to its second-best level. The reason is prudence. When σ > σ * , too much of the unobservable risk is being shared, so the level of effort exerted by each household is below its optimal level. Setting τ < 0.50, therefore, forces households to accept more risk associated with the In sum, the values of τ * and σ * cannot be determined independently in the secondbest economy in the presence of prudent agents. The sufficient condition (11) guarantees, though, that observable shocks will be fully shared at equilibrium. That sufficient condition is not needed in the first-best equilibrium where it is always efficient to share a given risk, independent of how other risks are shared.
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that Ricardian equivalence can hold even in the presence of incomplete risk sharing between parents and their children. Moral hazard prevents unobservable idiosyncratic shocks from being fully shared. But observable shocks, including public changes in the timing of taxes, are fully shared in equilibrium under a sufficient condition derived herein. We considered several specifications for preferences in which Ricardian equivalence holds, including separable quadratic, separable CARA, and separable CRRA.
(Closed-form solutions are not available in the CRRA case, so we can only conjecture that Ricardian equivalence holds on the basis of numerical simulations.) Future work could extend our results to an even larger class of utility functions, although we found it difficult to obtain closed-form solutions more generically. Future empirical work using linked household-level data could also attempt to distinguish between nonobservable and observable shocks, such as Social Security reforms. Performing such estimation, however, would be quite challenging at present; modern data sets do not yet span a long enough period containing many policy shocks. Still, Villanueva (2001) provides some indirect evidence that among children with spouses, parents are more likely to transfer resources when the child's household primary 19 earner loses income than when the secondary earner loses income. Since secondary earners have less attachment to the labor force, their level of effort becomes a relatively more important source of moral hazard, and so this empirical result is consistent with the our model.
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